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terests must be settled so as to promote public policy, or as is often
said, to do the greatest good for the greatest number with the
sacrifice of as few interests as possible. This, in the last analysis,
is the true solution of the problem. As population becomes denser
the public has an increasing interest that the productiveness of
each parcel of realty be increased. To impose the burden contended for, namely, make premises "child proof," upon the ownership of realty would directly thwart the public interest.'0 In some
cases indeed, it might discourage any improvement. From these
considerations of public interest, coupled with the fact that courts
have always been reluctant to impose new burdens upon the ownership of reality, we conclude that no such duty is justifiable. Why
should the duty be thrust upon the landowner rather than upon
the parent or guardian who is undoubtedly in a better position to
know the peculiar proclivities of the child. While the numerical
weight of authority still supports the Stout Case, the more recent
decisions show a tendency in the direction of absolving the landowner from liability. The fact that some of the courts which
first adopted the so-called Turntable Doctrine have more recently
taken express precautions to limit it specifically to turntables,
show that they regard it as an unwarranted transgression upon
established common law rules." If, as Judge Denman points out
in Dobbins v. Missouri etc. R. (o., 91 Tex. 60, 41 S. W. 62, there is
a necessity for any such duty in the case of a reservoir, or a turntable, etc., the state legislature should regulate the situation under
the broad arm of police power, rather than to require the courts to
usurp well founded principles of law.
-M. H. M.

PRACTICE AN PROCEDURE-INSTRUCTION TO JURIS--CREDmIBrrTor Wrr sEs.-The West Virginia decisions would appear to
be in some confusion on the subject of instructions to juries regarding credibility of witnesses, or at least it would seem that they are
not clear to everyone, such instructions having been the cause of a
number of reversals in recent years.
In the recent ease of State v. Powers' in a trial for larceny the
Court instructed the jury that "they are the sole judges of the
M 11 HARv. I. REV. 349, 363.
U 46 AM. L REV. 282.
1 113 S.E. 913 (W. Va. 1922).
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weight of testimony of any witness who has testified before them
. and in ascertaining such weight, they have a right to
...
take into consideration the credibility of such witness, as disclosed
from his evidence, his manner of testifying and demeanor upon the
witness stand, and his apparent interest, if any, in the result of
the case. And if the jury believe that any witness has testified
falsely as to any material fact they have the right to disreThis instruction was
gard all the testimony of such witness."
assigned as an error by the defendant. The Court dismissed the
assignment of error without discussion. The defendant cited
three cases in support of his point. In the first of these2 the Court
instructed the jury that "it is the sole judge of the evidence and
that it might believe or refuse to believe any witness." On appeal
it was held that this instruction was objectionable because it permitted the jury to reject testimony arbitrarily, and that a jury cannot without reason refuse consideration of testimony.
In the second ease cited by defendant 3 the Court instructed the
jury "that they are the sole judges of the evidence and that they
may believe or refuse to believe any witness and that when passing
upon credibility of witnesses they may take into consideration
his interest" etc. The court held this to be bad.
The third case cited by the defendant is State v. Long.4 Here the
instruction was "The Court instructs the jury that they are the
sole judges of the evidence and of the weight to be given thereto
and that they may believe or refuse to believe any witness or any
part of his evidence, and that when passing upon the credibility of
any witness they might take into consideration" etc. The giving of
this instruction was held to be reversible error.
The instruction that the jury "are the sole judges of the evidence and that they may believe or refuse to believe any witness"
was approved in two former West Virginia cases.' But as is
pointed out in State v. Long, supra, the Court later changed its
view and disapproved that instruction in State v. McCausland and
held likewise in State v. Lutz.'
It would appear that there is a literal distinction between the
instruction given in the Powers Case and that given in the Long
Case, in that the latter instruction would give the jury an absolute and arbitrary right to disregard evidence, while the former
Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938 (1918).
2 State v. Ringer, 84 W. Va. 546, 100 S. E. 413 (1919).
4 88 W. Va. 669. 108 S. B. 279 (1921).
5 State v. Dickey. 48 W. Va. 326, 37 S. B. 695 (1900).
State v. Bickle, 53 W. Va.
597, 45 S. H. 917 (1903).
a 85 W. Va. 330, 101 S. E. 434 (1919).
2 State v. McCausland, 82 W.
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would do so only for cause. But is this a distinction that would
be noticed by a jury so as to change the manner in which they
would regard any given testimony? Rather, are not the instructions so substantially alike that a reversal is not justified, even
though the former be the more correct? Does not either accomplish the purpose of an instruction?
The office of instructions is to aid the jury in arriving at a
proper verdict;T to instruct and not to confuse and mislead the
jury;8 to enlighten the minds of the jury on the law of the particular case.9
The decisions in other states on this point are not by any means
uniform. In Steber v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. the Court held that
"it is error to give instructions which authorize a jury to wholly
disregard evidence for speculation and unfounded reasons." In
Gibson v. Troutman," the Court held the following charge to be
erroneous: "The jury are to judge of the credibility of witnesses
and to give such weight to testimony as the jury may think, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, that the testimony of any witness
or witnesses is entitled to." They said this instruction was too
comprehensive and that a jury is only authorized to disbelieve a
witness when he is discredited in some of the modes known to the
law.
On the other hand, in Comstock v.Whitworth" the Court said
that an instruction regarding credibility of witnesses was erroneous
without the qualification that the jury is the exclusive judge of the
weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the inferences of fact to be drawn from the proofs.13 "The jury, and
not the court, are the proper and exclusive judges of credibility."' 4 The jury "are the exclusive judges of the credibility of
the witnesses and of the weight of all and each particular of the
testimony.'""" "The jury are the sole judges of the credibility of
the witnesses and are not required to believe everything said by
any witness."16 In Money v. Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co.Y an instruction that the jury were "the sole and exclusive judges of the evidence in the case and of the credibility of witnesses and the weight

7 State v.

Legg, 59

W.

Va. 315, 53 S. E. 545 (1906).

s Going v. Norfolk etc. R. Co., 119 Va. 543, 89 S. E.

914 (1916).

9 Higgins v. whitemore, 116 Va. 414, 82 S. E. 180 (1914).
1o 139 Wis. 10, 120 N. W. 502 (1909).
1 9 Ill.App. 94 (1881).
1" 75 Ind. 129 (1881).
22 3S CYC 1724.
14 Harrison v. Brock, 1 Munf. 22 (Va.1810).
is United States v. Hughes, 34 Fed. 734 (1888).
1$ Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 112 Ark. 607, 165 S. W. 951 (1914).
- 59 Wash. 120, 109 Pac. 307 (1910).
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to be attached to the testimony of each" was held to be proper.,
"The remark as to which of the witnesses was entitled to the
most credit, preceded and followed as it was by the explicit declaration that the jury were the sole judges alike of the correctness
and credibility of the witnesses, calls for no interference."" "It
is error to charge the jury that they are bound to believe a witness unless he is impeached." 2 °
Now, we have in the United States two distinct lines *ofdecisions,
one upholding an instruction that tells a jury that it may arbitrarily disbelieve testimony, the other holding such instruction to,
be erroneous. Decisions of either kind have been handed down
in West Virginia at different times. The question then arises as
to which decision is the sounder. From the cardinal principle of
the common law that the jury are the sole judges of the evidence
it would seem to follow that it is entirely within their province to
accept or refuse withih their own minds such testimony as they
see fit. Otherwise they are not the sole judges of the evidence. If
this be true, then the West Virginia Court should not reverse a
case because the jury has been instructed that they are the sole
judges of the evidence and that they may believe or refuse to believe any witness, as it has done in the recent decisions cited.
-R. G. K.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-LicENsE.-The petitioner averred that

section 35a of Chapter 32 Code 1913 as amended and re-enacted
by sections 35a and 35b of Chapter 109, Acts 1921, insofar as they
undertake to give the discretion to grant or refuse licenses
are in contravention of the equal protection of the law clause
of the United States Constition.
The section, the constitutionality of which is in question, provides that the county court may at its discretion grant or refuse the application
of any person for a license to keep a pool table for public resort.
Held, that the statute does not infringe the equal protection of
the law clause of the Federal Constitution. State, ex rel. Hamrick
v. Pocahontas County Court, et al., 114 S. E. 519, (W. Va. 1922).
Section 35b of Chapter 109, Acts 1921 transfers all powers,
including the discretionary power of section 35a, to the council of
1822

2nd Dec. Dig. 337.
29 Porter v. Seller, 23 Pa. St. 424, 62 Am. Dec. 841 (1854); 14 R. C. L. 733.
2
State v. Smallwood, 75 N. C. 104 (1876).
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